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HATE SPEECH, LEGITIMACY, AND THE
FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF
GOVERNMENT
Steven H. Shiffrin*
In a well-documented, intriguing, and intricately argued
article, James Weinstein maintains that restrictions on hate
speech are problematic because they tend to undermine the
legitimacy of anti-discrimination statutes.1 In so doing, he
develops an argument previously made by Ronald Dworkin with
sophistication and with greater complexity and needed detail. He
argues not only that such restrictions can undermine the
legitimacy of anti-discrimination laws with respect to their
popular acceptance, but also with respect to the political
obligation to obey them and with the morality of their
enforcement. The general idea is that persons precluded from
opposing a law are not legitimately subject to the law.
This argument seems to be an instance of the tail wagging the
dog. If hate speech restrictions are justifiable, then their
enforcement cannot undermine the normative legitimacy of antidiscrimination laws.2 If such restrictions are not justifiable, then
the impact on anti-discrimination laws is interesting, but not
central to the case against them.3 In fact, Weinstein argues that
the restrictions violate fundamental principles of our government
and what many regard as a fundamental principle of free speech.
Any legitimate government depends on adherence to the
*
1.

Charles Frank Reavis, Sr., Professor of Law Emeritus, Cornell University.
James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy and Political Legitimacy, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 527 (2017).
2. I am referring here only to the normative legitimacy of these laws. Weinstein
suggests the restrictions also weaken the legitimacy of anti-discrimination laws as
perceived. I think his discussion exaggerates the point, but I do not explore that matter
here.
3. For powerful material supporting hate speech restrictions, see JEREMY
WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (reprt. ed. 2014); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL.,
WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1993).
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proposition that government must treat all citizens as having
equal moral worth, or as Ronald Dworkin put it – with equal
respect and concern.4 In addition, all citizens should be able to
participate in the political process as political equals. Weinstein
maintains that hate speech restrictions violate both these
principles. In addition, he believes that such restrictions violate a
First Amendment mandate against point-of-view discrimination.
I will argue that hate speech restrictions do not violate
fundamental principles of government, nor are they instances of
impermissible point-of-view discrimination. I will maintain that
his claims about the legitimacy of anti-discrimination legislation
are not as broad or precise as they might appear. And, in
conclusion, I will maintain that there are concerns about some
hate speech restrictions that are more telling than the matters to
which he would call our attention.
I. RECONCILING HATE SPEECH RESTRICTIONS WITH
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Weinstein maintains that hate speech restrictions are
inconsistent with the view that government must treat all citizens
as having equal moral worth. But this confuses respect for persons
with respect for the speech with which they wish to engage. Free
speech doctrine contains many permissible restrictions on speech,
and it is not obvious that they show disrespect for persons. The
doctrine permits government to enact speech restrictions
involving some forms of advocacy of illegal action, some forms of
defamation, obscenity, copyright violations and the like.
Whatever the merits of these doctrines, they do not show
disrespect for a citizen as a citizen. They do not take the position
that a citizen lacks moral worth. At most, they show disrespect for
a particular speech choice the citizen would like to make.
So too, the notion that point-of-view discrimination is
impermissible is an overgeneralization. Even in the United States,
a more precise statement of the law would be that point-of-view
discrimination is impermissible except when it is not. So erotic
speech directed toward “good old fashioned healthy” interests in
sex are protected though appeals to prurient interests in some

4.

RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 190 (reprt. ed. 1985).
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cases are not.5 Nasty things said about a person in some contexts
are unprotected;6 nice things said about the same person are
protected. Advocacy of illegal action is unprotected in some
contexts;7 advocacy of legal action is protected. Two explanations
for these distinctions seem clear. First, the unprotected speech
causes harm and the protected speech does not.8 Second, in some
cases, such as obscenity9 (or fighting words10), the speech is
regarded as less valuable than other forms of speech. The notion
that speech law does not look at the value of speech is falsified not
only by obscenity and fighting words doctrine, but also by the view
that some forms of sexually oriented speech,11 commercial
speech,12 and private speech13 should be less protected than more
important political speech.
There is a strong case for the view that racist speech causes
harm and lacks substantial constitutional value. As I have written
elsewhere, racist speech causes
many well-documented harms: it is an assault on the dignity of
people of color; it humiliates and causes emotional distress,
sometimes with physical manifestations; it helps spread racial
prejudice, not only stigmatizing people of color in the eyes of
the societally dominant race but also in the eyes of [many of]
the victims themselves, inspiring self-hatred, isolation, and . . .
finally, it frequently creates the conditions for violence.14

Equally important, like other forms of unprotected speech,
racist speech should fall low in the hierarchy of First Amendment
values. Most people who would protect such speech recommend
that course despite its loathsome character, not because of it. To
5. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
6. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
7. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
8. So understood, a restriction on hate speech is not imposed merely because
government finds the speech disagreeable, disturbing, or offensive as Weinstein suggests.
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 529.
9. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
10. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
11. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
12. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
13. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
14. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA
77 nn.168–69 (2000). These sources do not depend on empirical studies, but the
experiences of human beings. When speech lacks a strong connection to the values
underlying the First Amendment, at least in my view, a demand for empirical studies
before regulation is not defensible. See generally STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT’S WRONG
WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT? (2016).
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be sure, racist speech is not wholly bereft of First Amendment
value. For example, it has marketplace value in that it reveals the
existence of racists in the society. Nonetheless, its overall
contribution to the market is negative in character. That is
precisely because of the foundational premise of the system.
Racists argue that government (and others) should not treat all
citizens will equal respect and concern. If racists have their way,
people of color will officially not be equal citizens and will not be
treated as equals in private and public spheres. In other words,
racists seek to topple the fundamental prerequisites of a
legitimate society and government. As I have argued elsewhere,
“[i]n this limited context, the best test of truth is the system’s
foundational premise of equality, not whether truth can emerge
triumphant in the market place of ideas.”15 To suggest that speech
causing substantial harm and designed to overrule the
fundamental premise of legitimate society and government
should be protected because of its value should be unthinkable.16
It follows from this that hate speech restrictions do not deny
citizens the equal opportunity to participate in the political
process. The equal opportunity to participate does not imply that
citizens have the right to engage in speech that is rightly restricted.

15. SHIFFRIN, supra note 14, at 78.
16. To my mind, Weinstein errs when he supposes that hate speech advocates are
entitled to pursue their hate speech interests, and recognizing that is required by a
fundamental principle of government. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 538, 541–42. Nor can
I join Weinstein in supposing that the interest in expressing racist views should be
protected because they help the speaker confirm his standing as a responsible agent. Id. at
21. As we have seen, the expression of racist views is harmful and at odds with the system’s
fundamental principle of equality. They do not show case the agent as responsible. See
Michael C. Dorf, Liberalism’s Errant Theodicy, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1469 (2013) (exploring the
limits of the responsible agent argument). The speaker’s interest rightly ranks low in the
constellation of values. Similarly, the speaker’s interest in “feeling better” in this context
ranks low, and the speaker’s interests do not outweigh the harm of the speech. Weinstein,
supra note 1, at 551.
Weinstein suggests that racist speech, like communist speech does not
successfully promote illegitimate government. Id. at 578, n.179. I do not agree with the
former particularly because the speech further subordinates an already vulnerable group,
which government has a responsibility to protect, and the speech plays a role in which
White Americans are privileged over Black Americans in myriad ways at local, state, and
national levels. In any event, the claim generally underestimates the harm of racist speech.
On the other hand, assuming some communists argue for the abolition of free speech, I
believe they too are advocating the overturning of a foundational principle of the system.
But the harm they create is not comparable to racist speech.
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The equal opportunity argument trades on the respect argument
which is itself not defensible.17
II. THE LEGITIMACY ARGUMENT
There is a germ of truth in the legitimacy argument. If you
are precluded from arguing against a law, that should count as a
factor against enforcing the law against you. Of course, citizens
are not prevented from arguing against anti-discrimination laws.
They might argue that a federal law infringes with local rights and
they might argue that a federal or state civil rights law interferes
with freedom of association. Weinstein is not contending that
persons have been denied the ability to argue against such laws in
these ways. He is arguing that European laws preventing hate
speech against groups (even if they do not address antidiscrimination laws) undermine the legitimacy of antidiscrimination laws.
A. SYSTEMIC ILLEGITIMACY
With some exceptions, I find this whole line of arguments
about legitimacy to be extremely dubious. Anti-discrimination
laws are designed to protect vulnerable groups in the society, and
it is strongly arguable that governmental claims of legitimacy are
strained with respect to many of these groups. Indeed, the
legitimacy claim of the American government is hard to maintain.
It is now a commonplace that the government represents lobbyists
for the rich at the expense of the people. The government itself is
structured to assure that the majority cannot rule,18 as Charles
Beard warned long ago.19 And to take an obvious example, we live
in a racist society in which the government not only fails to assure
adequate food, clothing, housing, and medical care for African

17. Weinstein’s contention that Britain’s ban on promoting racial or ethnic
discrimination while permitting the promotion of racial tolerance is impermissible pointof-view discrimination reflects the approach a U.S. court would take to the issue. See id. at
545–46. But the law on point-of-view discrimination is checkered, and the better approach
would be to recognize that racist speech causes unjustifiable harm and promoting racial
tolerance does not.
18. For example, the United States Senate, the Electoral College, the Presidential
veto, the gerrymander, and the system of campaign finance.
19. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
(Dover Publ’ns 2004) (1913). If revolution is not justified in the United States, it is not
because the government is worthy of our respect. It would either be because of pacifist
principles or because revolution would be unsuccessful or cause more harm than good.
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Americans (and poor people generally), but it also maintains
police departments with cultures designed to cover up the police
murders of unarmed Black men. Restrictions of hate speech are
designed to reinforce the moral, legal, and political view that
African Americans are equal citizens, and to prevent the harms
associated with hate speech. Anti-discrimination laws are
designed to mitigate the hard edges of illegitimacy in American
society.20 To put it another way, both hate speech restrictions21
and anti-discrimination laws are not only permissible, but
required to make the system more legitimate.
From this perspective, it seems more than a little odd to argue
that restrictions on hate speech, which show respect for equal
citizenship and help to mitigate the racism of an illegitimate
system should not be enacted for fear that such restrictions would
undermine the legitimacy of anti-discrimination legislation,
legislation which also shows respect for equal citizenship and
helps to mitigate the racism of an illegitimate system.
To be fair, Weinstein maintains that he is not talking about
systemic illegitimacy, he is talking about the relationship between
hate speech restrictions and anti-discrimination legislation
without reference to systemic illegitimacy. But systemic
legitimacy cannot be hermetically sealed off from the legitimacy
of a particular law. If the overall system is illegitimate with respect
to a particular group, the claim that an anti-discrimination law
designed to help that group is itself illegitimate becomes
breathtaking.

20. Weinstein can be read as supporting Professor Baker’s view that legitimacy
depends on respect for formal autonomy. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 57778, n.175. The
dispute between Professor Baker and me cannot be passed off as involving two different
conceptions of legitimacy. The dispute was primarily about the nature of autonomy and
the extent to which respect for what Baker characterized as formal autonomy as he
conceived it was necessary for legitimacy. Baker recognized that infringement of
autonomy was necessary in any complex society, but he wanted those infringements to be
carefully limited and he did not want a Millian conception of harm coupled with balancing
to mark out the acceptable limitations from the unacceptable limitations. Instead, for the
most part he maintained that autonomy could only be rightly limited when the autonomous
person engaged in coercion or manipulation and he embarked on an attempt to define
coercion and manipulation. I argued that Baker’s apparatus designed to improve on John
Stuart Mill was unsuccessful. Thus, government did not need to forego restrictions on racist
speech to maintain legitimacy. Steven H. Shiffrin, Freedom of Speech and Two Types of
Autonomy, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 337, 338–41 (2011).
21. In the conclusion, I argue that some hate speech restrictions are unwise.
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So too, Weinstein seeks to shore up the dam when he
concedes that the use of vituperative hate speech that stirs up
racial hatred in expressing opposition to an anti-discrimination
law does “not seem to destroy, or even substantially diminish” the
obligation to obey an anti-discrimination measure.22 Yet the most
influential advocates of restrictions on hate speech do not seek to
foreclose opposition to anti-discrimination measures, they seek to
prevent the use of virulent hate speech.23 So Weinstein might be
counted out as a general opponent of hate speech restrictions. So
to be clear, it is the expression of non-vituperative prejudiced
views that Weinstein believes needs to be protected in order to
protect the legitimacy of anti-discrimination statutes.
Another qualification by Weinstein seems to give up the
ghost with respect to racist speech restrictions. He indicates that
the problem of justifying coercion to a free and autonomous
person arises only when that person reasonably disagrees with the
law.24 But Weinstein would have to get up very early in the
morning to formulate a persuasive case that arguments based in
racial prejudice amount to reasonable disagreements with the law.
So too, Weinstein later argues that some laws (most criminal laws)
are morally imperative and are not rendered illegitimate. Only
laws about which there can be reasonable disagreement are
subject to his concern about illegitimacy. Yet in a society rife with
racial discrimination, it seems clear that anti-discrimination laws
are themselves morally imperative.
The significance of this should be clear. Much of the
literature on hate speech has focused on racist speech. Weinstein’s
argument simply does not apply to the paradigm case of hate
speech.
B. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HATE SPEECH
Weinstein searches for examples, therefore, outside the area
of race and ethnicity. He ends up focusing on restrictions
involving same-sex sexual conduct. He admits that speech
restrictions do not prevent people from opposing laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Instead, they
restrict people from saying that gays or lesbians are immoral or
22. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 548.
23. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
24. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 536.
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disordered. Although Weinstein has found some cases enforcing
this in limited contexts, it is not at all clear to me that such
restrictions have had much deterrent value, nor is it clear just what
the scope of these restrictions are. For example, officials of the
Catholic Church have been singing this bad song for centuries and
they have not stopped. Moreover, Weinstein opposes these
restrictions only when they affect public discourse,25 and in this
European law for the most part follows suit. This leaves broad
room for the expression of prejudiced views in the private sphere.
Nonetheless, Weinstein argues that those who have been
prevented from expressing the view even in limited public fora
that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral or disordered have no
political (as opposed to a moral) obligation to obey antidiscrimination laws.26 By this he means that those restricted need
not feel the obligation to obey these laws just because they are
laws.27 One might think that this is a straightforward application
of Habermas’ thesis that just laws cannot be legitimized without a
just process.28
But Weinstein’s conclusion is overdrawn. It simply begs the
question of proper remedy.29 If one is faced with an improper
restriction, the appropriate course would be to seek a restraining
order or damages. If one loses and does not receive a remedy, one
should try to move in the political system to overturn the
restriction. It is not at all obvious that the existence of the
restriction confers a license to disobey an anti-discrimination
statute. That, however, is what Weinstein maintains. He
apparently supposes that but for the hate speech restrictions
(blocking speech which itself ordinarily appeals to extremists with
a broader potential for alienation), an anti-discrimination law
25. It strikes me as odd that material with public content would not fall within the
category of public discourse, and perhaps Weinstein does not intend to exclude it. But see
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 559–60.
26. Id. at 561.
27. Id. at 534 n.25, 564 n.136.
28. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., The
MIT Press reprt. ed. 1998) (1996) (Habermas calls this the co-originality thesis).
29. One would think that the appropriate response to the injustice of process (as well
as to unjust laws) would at least depend upon the subjective and objective importance of
resistance, the seriousness of the injustice, the effectiveness of the response, and the
possible injury to innocent victims associated with the response. See also supra note 19.
For an intellectual history of the question when and whether violence is an appropriate
response to injustice among American radicals, see MARC STEARS, DEMANDING
DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN RADICALS IN SEARCH OF A NEW POLITICS (2013).
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would have been blocked. This supposition is dubious. Weinstein
points to no example. So we are left with the claim that a lawful
restriction without likely practical consequence licenses some
persons (those who were restrained), but not others to disobey a
just law. Nor are we presented with any reflection regarding how
many other laws would be subject to disobedience licenses
because of the existence of bad or imperfect process.30
Beyond political obligation, Weinstein recognizes that the
crucial question is whether the state can morally enforce the law
against those deterred by speech restrictions. That issue for
Weinstein preliminarily turns on whether their objections to the
law are reasonable.31 I do not think this question gets the
consideration it deserves. On the one hand, one might think that
these views (with which I have no sympathy) cannot simply be
dismissed as unreasonable given that they have been held for
centuries. On the other hand, those views for the most part are
Biblically based. The non-Biblical arguments in my view can
comfortably be dismissed as unreasonable, and, meanwhile, at
least in the United States, the Biblical arguments cannot be
accepted as good reasons precisely because the Establishment
Clause precludes government from taking theological positions.
In European countries, however, lacking an Establishment
Clause, I am just not sure whether government can dismiss long
held Biblical views as not reasonable.
Without discussing this, Weinstein asserts that antidiscrimination laws on the basis of sexual orientation have
substantial enough moral weight to outweigh the concerns of
those who were prevented from expressing views relevant to the
law. I agree with this conclusion, but there is an ipse dixit flavor to
the discussion.
At this point, Weinstein comes to the payoff – a case where
he contends that the illegitimacy argument is said to bear fruit.
The case is a variation on Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock.32
In that case, a commercial photographer refused to photograph a
30. For similar argumentation, see Jeremy Waldron, The Conditions of Legitimacy:
A Response to James Weinstein, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 697 (2017).
31. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 566–67.
32. Although the corporation is called Elane Photography, LLC, the photographer’s
name is Elaine Huguenin. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M.
2013). The corporation was closely held between the photographer and her husband. For
discussion of the free speech claims in the case, see Steven Shiffrin, What is Wrong with
Compelled Speech?, 29 J. L. & POL. 499 (2014).
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same-sex commitment ceremony primarily because she was
religiously opposed to such ceremonies. Weinstein imagines in his
variation that the photographer was deterred in a European
country from participating in a demonstration opposing among
other things anti-discrimination laws based on sexual orientation.
He contends that applying the law to her in these circumstances
may render the law immoral as applied to her.33
In other words, other photographers with religious
objections can be compelled to violate their religious beliefs, but
not those who were deterred from participating in demonstrations
bearing on the anti-discrimination laws. I think the Willock case
presents a difficult issue. Gays and lesbians should be able to
participate in the market on an equal footing with other citizens.
At the same time, individuals should not be compelled to violate
their religious beliefs in the absence of a powerful showing. It can
be argued that someone involved in commerce has an obligation
to serve everyone. But this tells evangelical Christians and
practitioners of some other religions that they cannot be wedding
photographers, not to mention many other occupations.
Moreover, in the Willock case there were many dozens of
commercial photographers available to work at such a ceremony.
It is not at all clear why any gay or lesbian couple would want to
hire a photographer who religiously opposes same-sex
commitment ceremonies.34 I conclude that commercial
photographers should not be compelled to violate their religion in
this kind of case even if they were not deterred from protesting an
anti-discrimination statute. The legitimacy argument would have
no bearing. Indeed, I would be reluctant to adopt a rule that
excused some from obeying a law, but not others, based on their
willingness to participate in demonstrations, rather than their
sincerely held religious beliefs.
CONCLUSION
Weinstein has offered an intriguing presentation for a
position that I do not happen to share. This does not mean that I
33. Weinstein discusses some other cases involving landlords in Britain, but the
record does not show any deterrence of opposition to the legislation and the legal
restrictions on the opportunity to do so are far less stringent. Weinstein, supra note 1, at
569–74.
34. Willock was unaware of the views held by Elane when she tried to hire her.
Willock, 309 P.3d at 59–60.
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endorse all hate speech restrictions. I do think that our
Constitution should make room for the narrow prescription of
targeted racist insults35 and of “speech with a message of racial
inferiority, that is directed against a historically oppressed group,
and that is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading.”36 I also think it
was wrong for the courts to conclude that a march of Nazis in
Skokie should be constitutionally protected. If the Nazis had
marched in Skokie, there would have been tens of thousands of
counter demonstrators and major bloodshed. Allowing them to
demonstrate was a river boat gamble.37
In the wake of an election in which it is possible that racist
speech was a but for cause (along with many others) of the
election results, it might be tempting (assuming vagueness
concerns could be surmounted) to conclude that the United States
should take an even larger page from the direction taken by
Canada and countries in Europe. Nonetheless, it is at least
arguable that general hate speech restrictions would promote
racism rather than effectively combat it. We live in a racist society.
It is possible that hate speech restrictions would be conceived as
yet another measure to cater to minorities while the needs of
white citizens are ignored. It is possible that those who are
subjected to sanctions for hate speech will wrap themselves in the
American flag and gain sympathy. Whether this line of argument
against hate speech restrictions should be accepted depends upon
empirical conditions.38 But it does not assume that hate speech
restrictions implicate substantial First Amendment value, nor
does it join Weinstein in fearing that they lead to illegitimate
legislation, deny respect to citizens, engage in impermissible
point-of-view discrimination, or deny the equal opportunity to
participate in the political process.

35. For a detailed discussion of how to apply this principle, see SHIFFRIN, supra note
14, at 76 n.161.
36. Matsuda, supra note 23, at 2357. I would consider extending Matsuda’s approach
beyond the racial context. It should be noted that Matsuda’s definition among other things
would not cover scholarly arguments for racial superiority and the like. Apart from what I
say in the text, I would protect these communications as well.
37. The gamble worked. The Nazis did not march in Skokie because of the realistic
fear of violence. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE FIRST
AMENDMENT?, 42–43 (2016).
38. SHIFFRIN, supra note 14, at 80–87.

